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Emotional intelligence is composed of a set of emotional abilities, including recognition of 
emotional states in the self and others, the use of emotions to guide thoughts and behaviours, and 
emotion regulation. Previous studies have demonstrated that emotional intelligence is associated 
with mental health, social problem solving, interpersonal relationship quality, and academic and job 
performance. Although emotional intelligence has received much interest both in basic research 
fields and applied and clinical fields, the mechanisms underlying the functions of emotional 
intelligence remain unclear. The aim of the present article was to consider the mechanisms of 
emotional intelligence using a computational approach. Recent theories of emotion in psychology 
and neuroscience have emphasized the importance of predictive processing. It has been proposed 
that the brain creates internal models that can provide predictions for sensation and motor movement, 
and perception and behaviors emerge from Bayesian computations rooted in these predictions. This 
theoretical framework has been expanded to include interoceptive perception of the internal body to 
explain affect and decision-making as phenomena based on interoception. This perspective has 
implications for understanding issues of emotional intelligence. 
 






Emotional intelligence is a set of emotional abilities that aids adaptation to the 
external environment, and it is generally considered to be composed of several 
factors, including recognition of emotional states in the self and others, the use of 
emotions to guide thoughts and behaviors, and emotion regulation (Hogeveen, Salvi, 
& Grafman, 2016; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Previous studies have reported that 
higher emotional intelligence is associated with better mental health (Kee et al., 
2009), greater social problem solving abilities (Barbey et al., 2014), higher quality 
interpersonal relationships (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006), 
and better academic and job performance (Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2011; 
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Libbrecht, Lievens, Carette, & Côté, 2014). Although it has received much interest 
both in basic research fields and applied and clinical fields, there has been substantial 
debate about whether emotional intelligence is a valid scientific construct, in both 
methodological and theoretical domains (Conte, 2005; Murphy, 2006).  
One of the limitations of emotional intelligence as a valid construct is that the 
mechanisms underlying the functions of emotional intelligence are currently unclear. 
Hogeveen et al. (2016) proposed candidate brain regions related to various 
components of emotional intelligence based on findings from patients with brain 
lesions. These findings are useful for understanding how the components of 
emotional intelligence are constructed by the functions of various brain regions. 
However, the fundamental principles by which emotional intelligence is produced 
remain to be elucidated. The current article considers the principles supporting 
emotional intelligence from the perspectives of the psychological constructivist 
theory of emotion (Barrett, 2017; Barrett, Quigley, & Hamilton, 2016; Barrett & 
Simmons, 2015) and predictive coding (Friston, 2010; Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 
2006), which are influential theoretical frameworks in modern psychology and 
neuroscience. 
The psychological constructivist theory of emotion is based on the concept of 
predictive coding, which hypothesizes that the brain constructs internal models with 
various functional layers, and that every function of the brain emerges from 
computations of the models and input signals. In psychological constructivist theory, 
it is hypothesized that internal interoceptive signals from the body also emerge via 
the same predictive principles. Furthermore, it has been proposed that all mental 
functions, including perception, motor function, cognition, and affect can be 
produced based on predictive interoception. Because this theoretical framework is a 
kind of meta-theory, empirical verification of the whole theory is difficult. However, 
this theoretical framework is useful because it enables speculation about the 
functional associations between the brain and body, and supports the development of 
hypotheses that can be examined empirically (for details, see Ohira, 2018a). The 
current article first introduces the psychological constructivist theory of emotion, 
then proposes a computational model explaining the emergence of affect and 
decision-making based on the prediction of homeostasis (i.e., allostasis), and finally 
outlines the implications of this model for understanding emotional intelligence. 
 
Predictive Coding of Interoception, Decision-Making, and Allostasis 
 
The brain is not a passive organ that solely responds to input signals from 
sensory organs. Rather, the brain actively constructs perception based on internal 
models predicting future input signals, and on computations of differences between 
predictions and input signals (prediction error). This theoretical principle of brain 
function is called "predictive coding" (Friston, 2010; Rao & Ballard, 1999). In the 
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theory of predictive coding, processes of perception in the brain are explained as an 
analogy of the principles of Bayesian statistics (Ainley, Apps, Fotopoulou, & Tsakiris, 
2016). The prediction of perception by an internal model is expressed as a 
probabilistic distribution, corresponding to the prior distribution in Bayesian 
statistics. Sensory input can also be expressed as a probabilistic distribution, and 
prediction error is computed as the difference between the distributions of the 
prediction and sensory input. This sensory input corresponds to observation or 
likelihood in Bayesian statistics, and the posterior distribution is computed based on 
updating in Bayes' theorem. Our subjective experiences of perception can be 
considered as awareness of the computational processes of the posterior distribution. 
It is thought that such Bayesian computations are involved in processing in every 
modality of perception and motor function. Organisms, including humans, construct 
and maintain integrated and consistent images of self and the world by minimizing 
the sum of the prediction error. To minimize prediction error, the organism will either 
update the internal model or actively modulate the sensory input by changing 
behaviour. 
Barrett and colleagues proposed that, in addition to exteroception (e.g. vision 
and hearing) and proprioception (perception of the location of the body and bodily 
movement), interoception (perception of the internal body, such as internal organs 
and vessels) is established by the principle of predictive coding (Ainley et al., 2016; 
Barrett & Simmons, 2015, 2016; Seth & Friston, 2016). To maintain homeostasis, 
organisms must regulate bodily states appropriately. To achieve this, the brain 
represents the body's current state and its desirable state (set point) and constructs an 
internal model of the body to satisfy the set points of the bodily states. The model 
determines desirable ranges of states, including blood pressure, blood glucose level, 
as well as concentrations of hormones and cytokines, depending on specific 
situations. When the brain receives bodily signals, the signals are compared with 
predictions by the internal model, and the differences between them are computed as 
prediction errors. Organisms regulate their bodily states to minimize prediction errors. 
To reduce prediction errors, an organism both updates its internal model and alters 
its bodily states. 
In this theoretical framework, interoception can function as a signal to inform 
whether the current bodily state is within the range of homeostasis, or if it deviates 
from this range. Deviation of bodily states from the range of homeostasis constitutes 
a threat for organisms. Thus, in such a case, there is a drive to change bodily states 
to be within the range of homeostasis. This modification of bodily states in a 
desirable direction is experienced as pleasant affect, and a lack of change or a change 
in an undesirable direction is felt as unpleasant affect. Furthermore, it has been 
argued that impairment of this regulatory process of the body based on interoception 
results in mental disorders, such as depression, anxiety, developmental disorders, and 
fatigue (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Stephan et al., 2016). 
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Keramati and Gutkin (2014) expanded this idea, describing an association 
between interoception and decision-making (Figure 1). Although bodily states are 
high-dimensional, we consider two factors as examples: blood pressure and blood 
glucose level. The set points of these two dimensions of bodily states are expressed 
as point H* on a level surface H in Figure 1. A neural representation of these two 
factors at time point t, 𝐻𝑡 corresponds to interoception. As 𝐻𝑡 is distant from H*, 
there is a drive, 𝑑(𝐻𝑡), to move 𝐻𝑡 into H*. This drive is expressed as the curved 
surface whose peak is just above the H* in Figure 1. If the individual chooses an 
action that causes the bodily states to move to 𝐻𝑡+1 at the next time point t+1, the 
drive will reduce to 𝑑(𝐻𝑡+1). Thus, the difference 𝐾𝑡 will be evaluated as reward 
𝑟(𝐻𝑡, 𝐾𝑡). The signal of this reward will be conveyed to the brain and utilized to 
update values of the current states and the action, on the basis of the principle of 
reinforcement learning. Specifically, a reward is determined as the degree of 
movement of bodily states in the direction of the desirable set point. In this way, 
reward is considered to be fundamentally rooted in bodily states. In humans, more 
abstract representations such as money and favourable reputation from others can 
function as rewards via the ability to construct representations and to link such 
representations with bodily states. 
The set point of bodily states H* is not always fixed and can be actively changed 
by the demands of environments and social contexts. This function involves 
modulation of the prediction of bodily states produced from the internal model by 
higher level internal models and corresponds to the physiological concept of 
"allostasis." Here, I hypothesize that the top- down signal regulating allostasis can be 
modulated by "reward prediction error" signals in the reinforcement learning 
algorithm in the brain. Reinforcement learning is one of the basic mechanisms of 
learning and decision-making. In this algorithm, the values of options are 
continuously updated using reward prediction error signals. If an individual chooses 
an option and the obtained outcome is better than the prediction (the current value), 
the sign of the reward prediction error is positive, and the value of the option is 
updated upward. If the outcome is worse than the prediction, the sign of the reward 
prediction error is negative, and the value of the option is updated downward. At the 
next opportunity, the individual will make a decision by a comparison of the values 
of the options. When reward prediction error increases, the sign of the reward 
prediction error is either positive or negative, and some coping behaviours are needed 
to acquire reward or avoid harm. In this case, the set point of bodily states will be 
regulated upward to elevate physical energy levels. On the other hand, a decrease in 
reward prediction error indicates the completion of learning; thus, the set point of 
bodily states will be regulated downward to save energy. 
This theoretical framework can seamlessly integrate concepts of various 
psychological phenomena, such as bodily states, interoception, reward, value, 
decision-making, and affect. The well-tuned and functional aspects of these 
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processes might provide the basis of emotional intelligence. 
 
 
Figure 1. Reward, decision-making, and affect determined by bodily states. Set points of 
blood pressure and blood glucose level are represented as H*. As the neural representation of 
bodily states at a time point t, Ht is distant from the set point, the drive d(Ht) to move Ht to 
H* happens. If this organism chooses an action (decision-making) and the bodily state moves 
to Ht+1, the drive reduces to d(Ht+1) and the difference between d(Ht) and d(Ht+1) is 
evaluated as a reward. The difference between the obtained reward and the current value of 
the option is computed as a reward prediction error. The signal of the reward prediction error 
is used to update values of the current states and the option, and to shift the set point of bodily 
states (dashed arrow in Figure 1). As coping is needed in a situation where reward prediction 
error increases, the set point of bodily states is shifted upward. As the reduction of reward 
prediction error indicates the completion of learning and adjustment to the environment, no 
more effort is needed. In such a situation, the set point of bodily states is shifted downward to 
save physical energy. 
 
Computational Model of Interoception, Decision-Making, and Allostasis 
 
A previous study by the author (Ohira, 2019) proposed a computational model 
to explain the dynamic functions of the predictive coding of interoception and 








Figure 2. Hierarchical predictive coding of interoception and reinforcement learning. Normal: 
normal distribution, PE: prediction error, e: noise expressed by normal distribution. A: 
Regulatory processes of bodily states (blood pressure) by predictive coding of interoception 
(Ohira, 2018b). B: Influences of reward prediction error in reinforcement learning on higher 
model of bodily states (blood pressure). 
 
Here, as an example of the regulation of bodily states by interoception, an 
internal model of blood pressure (x) is considered. This internal model is expressed 
by a probabilistic distribution (normal distribution), with mean 𝜇𝑡 and variance 
𝜋𝑡
−1 (π is precision, reciprocal number of variance) at a time point t. The mean 𝜇𝑡 
is the prediction of blood pressure at this time point and can function as the set point 
of blood pressure. The real value of blood pressure at this time point is expressed as 
𝑥𝑡.  This  value  is  conveyed  to  the  brain  by  a  hyperbolic  function,  with 
noise, 𝑒1(Normal~(0, 𝜋𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦
−1 ). As such, a neural representation of blood pressure at 
this time point, 𝑦𝑡 is formed. By comparison between the prediction 𝜇𝑡 and the 
neural representation of blood pressure 𝑦𝑡, prediction error 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡 is computed. 
H. Ohira: 
Predictive Processing of Allostasis 
7 
The principle of predictive coding aims to reduce this prediction error. Therefore, the 
mean and variance (precision) at the next time point 𝑡 + 1, are updated as follows, 
using Bayes' theorem. 
Mean in model of blood pressure: 
*(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡),    (1) 




,    (2) 
At the same time, an action a works on the body to reduce prediction error. For 
example, the activities of the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems are 
modulated to alter blood pressure. This effect is expressed as the following 




∗ −(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡)),    (3) 
By this effect, blood pressure continuously changes with a certain temporal 
delay. This process is expressed by the following differential equation: 𝜏 is time 
constant  controlling  the  temporal  delay  (here, 𝜏 = 5) and 𝑒2  is  a  noise term 





= 𝑓(𝑎) + 𝑒2 ,    (4) 
It has been hypothesized that the generation of such prediction of interoception 
is conducted in the anterior insula, and computation of prediction error is conducted 
in the posterior insula (Figure 2A; Barrett & Simmons, 2015).  
Imagine a situation where an individual performs a typical decision-making task 
in which reward is stochastically delivered by a choice. In this article, a simple two-
armed bandit task is considered, in which one option is linked with a monetary 
reward at a probability of 70% and the other option is linked with a monetary reward 
at a probability of 30%. To represent top-down modulation of the internal model of 
blood pressure accompanying the execution of this decision-making task, a higher-
layer model is added (Figure 2B). This higher model is also expressed by a normal 
probabilistic distribution, with mean 𝜇ℎ 𝑡 and variance 𝜋ℎ 𝑡
−1 at a time point t. At the 
initiation of the decision-making task, this higher model is applied and its mean 𝜇ℎ 𝑡 
is output as the higher prediction into the internal model of blood pressure. The 
higher prediction error is then computed as the difference between the current value 
of prediction in the internal model of blood pressure 𝜇𝑡 and the higher prediction 
𝜇ℎ 𝑡 . Using this prediction error, the mean and variance (precision) in the higher 
morel are updated as follows. 
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Mean in higher model: 
𝜇ℎ 𝑡+1 = 𝜇ℎ 𝑡 +
𝜋𝑡 
𝜋ℎ 𝑡+𝜋𝑡 
*(𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇ℎ 𝑡),    (5) 




,    (6) 
 
The prediction error in the higher model also affects updating of the internal 
model of blood pressure. Thus, equations (1) and (2) are replaced as follows. 
Mean in model of blood pressure:  
𝜇𝑡+1 = 𝜇𝑡 +
𝜋𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 
𝜋𝑡+𝜋𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦 
*(𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡) + tanh (
𝜋ℎ 𝑡
𝜋ℎ 𝑡+𝜋𝑡
∗ −(𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇ℎ 𝑡)),    (7) 








Figure 4A shows a typical result of simulation for changes of blood pressure 
accompanying the execution of the decision-making task. At the initiation of the task 
(① in Figure 4A), the higher model (𝜇ℎ 𝑡 = 0.2, 𝜋ℎ 𝑡 = 10000 ) was applied, 
resulting in elevation of blood pressure by an upward shift of the prediction in the 
internal model of blood pressure (𝜇 𝑡 = 0, 𝜋 𝑡 = 100). At the termination of the task 
(② in Figure 4A), the influence of the higher model was removed and blood pressure 
returned to the baseline. However, this simulation of blood pressure is fixed, with no 
influence of the context on decision-making. Thus, a typical algorithm of 
reinforcement learning, Q learning, is then introduced into the model (Lee, Seo, & 
Jung, 2012). 
𝑄(𝑎(𝑡))(𝑡 + 1) = 𝑄𝑎(𝑡)(𝑡) + 𝛼 (𝑅(𝑡) − 𝑄𝑎(𝑡)(𝑡)),    (9) 




,    (11) 
𝑄(𝑖(𝑡))(𝑡) in equation (9) indicates the value of each option, i = a, b, at a time 
point t. If reward 𝑅(𝑡)   is  acquired  by  choosing  option  a,  the difference 
between the reward prediction 𝑄(𝑎(𝑡))(𝑡) and 𝑅(𝑡) is computed as the reward 
prediction error: RPE𝑡 (equation 10). 
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Here, reward is manipulated as 1 or 0 for simplicity. Positive RPE indicates that 
the outcome was better than the prediction; thus, the value of the option is updated 
upward. Negative RPE indicates that the outcome was worse than the prediction; 
thus, the value of the option is updated downward. Based on current values of the 
options, the probability of choosing option "A" from the two options is expressed by 
equation (11). The parameter α in the equation (9) is called the "learning rate", and 
controls the degree to which the value is updated by RPE in a single trial. An 
excessively low learning rate results in slow learning; however, an excessively high 
learning rate is linked with unstable learning that is substantially influenced by each 
single outcome. The parameter β in equation (11) is called "inverse temperature", and 
controls the weighting of the difference of values in choice of options. Larger inverse 
temperature values indicate a strategy of choice that is sensitive to differences in 
values; this strategy is called exploitation. Smaller inverse temperature indicates 
greater randomness in choice; this strategy is called exploration. Combination of 
these parameters determines the characteristics or individual differences of decision-
making. For example, depressive individuals typically show lower learning rates and 
inverse temperature, compared with healthy individuals (Kunisato, Katahira, 
Okimura, & Yamashita, 2019). This pattern of the two parameters in depressive 
people might indicate slower and inefficient learning, as well as unstable choice. 
As described above, RPE is hypothesized to affect the higher model. 
Specifically, when the absolute value of RPE increases, the mean of the higher model 
is shifted upward. When the absolute value of RPE decreased, the mean of the higher 
model is shifted downward. RPE within n trials ago (here, n = 4) would be expected 
to affect the higher model with a discounting rate, δ (here, δ = 0.1). Thus, an 
accumulated RPE at time point t is determined as follows (equation (12)). The 
denominator in equation (12) is included for standardization. 
RPE𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑡  =
|RPE(𝑡)|+ 𝛿|RPE(𝑡−1)| + 𝛿2|RPE(𝑡−2)|+⋯𝛿𝑛|RPE(𝑡−𝑛)|
1+ 𝛿 + 𝛿2+⋯𝛿𝑛
,     (12) 
A change in accumulated RPE at the time point t is expressed as follows: 
ΔRPE𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑡  = RPE𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑡 − RPE𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑡−1,     (13) 
This change of accumulated RPE is thought to affect the higher model. Equation 
(5) is then replaced as follows. 
Mean in higher model: 
𝜇ℎ 𝑡+1 = 𝜇ℎ 𝑡 +
𝜋𝑡 
𝜋ℎ 𝑡+𝜋𝑡 
*(𝜇𝑡 − 𝜇ℎ 𝑡) + tanh(𝜃 ∗ ∆RPE𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑡),    (14) 
θ is a parameter that determines the degree of influence of RPE on the higher 
model (here, θ = 0.5). As such, the dynamics of allostasis which regulate bodily states 
by alteration of the set point of bodily states based on RPE in decision-making 
(Figure 1) has been modelled.  
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Parameters in The Computational Model and Allostatic Regulation 
 
Through simulation using the computational model described above, 
characteristics of decision-making and allostatic regulation in healthy individuals and 
those in emotionally non-functional individuals, such as patients with depression, 
were compared. Depression is associated with less functional styles of emotional 
intelligence. Typical symptoms of depression, such as negativity bias in attention and 
thoughts, impaired emotion regulation, and behavioural deficits caused by lack of 
motivation are closely associated with failures in aspects of emotional intelligence. 
Imagine a situation in which a depressive individual and a healthy individual perform 
the two-armed bandit decision-making task described above. Based on previous 
studies (Kunisato et al., 2019; Toyama, Katahira, & Ohira, 2019), learning rate (α) 
and inverse temperature (β) in reinforcement learning are set to lower values in the 
depressive individual (α = 0.2, β = 3.0) than in the healthy individual (α = 0.05, β = 
0.8). Figure 3 shows typical results of simulation of 120 trials of the decision-making 
task using these parameters. The healthy individual rapidly learned the contingency 
between options and outcomes. Thus, the advantageous option became chosen more 
often, resulting in a reduction of RPE. In contrast, in the depressive individual, the 
speed of learning was slow due to the smaller learning rate and the disadvantageous 
option was also chosen more often, due to the lower inverse temperature, resulting 
in maintenance of larger RPE. 
 A. Healthy individual 
Reward prediction error 
 B. Depressive individual 



















Figure 3. Simulation of the reinforcement learning underlying decision-making. A healthy 
individual (A) and a depressive individual (B) conduct 120 trials of a decision-making task. 
The learning rate and inverse temperature were lower in the depressive individual than in the 
healthy individual (α: 0.2, 0.05; β: 3.0, 0.8, respectively). Figures show a typical example of 
changes in reward prediction error and choices of advantageous and disadvantageous options. 
H. Ohira: 
Predictive Processing of Allostasis 
11 
Figure 4 indicates the responses of blood pressure during the decision-making 
task in both individuals. In the healthy individual (Figure 4B), a large RPE that 
occurred at the initiation of the decision-making task affected the internal model of 
blood pressure, resulting in an upward shift of the set point of blood pressure, and 
substantial elevation of blood pressure. Then, as RPE gradually reduced as learning 
progressed, the set point of blood pressure was modulated downward, leading to a 
rapid decline in blood pressure. Psychologically, this phenomenon can be interpreted 
as habituation of physiological responses to a situation. Finally, blood pressure 
returned to baseline at the termination of the decision-making task. A previous study 
in the author's laboratory revealed a similar pattern of real temporal changes of blood 
pressure during the same decision-making task in humans (Kimura, Ohira, Isowa, 
Matsunaga, & Murashima, 2007). The consistency between the results of the 
simulation and real experimental data support the validity of the computational 
model proposed in the current article. 
In the depressive individual (Figure 4C), as RPE did not converge, its influences 
on the internal model of blood pressure continued; thus, habituative reduction of 
blood pressure did not occur. Furthermore, a high level of blood pressure was 
maintained even after the termination of the task. This pattern can be interpreted as a 
state called allostatic load (McEwen, 1998). It is thought that chronic allostatic load 
can cause systemic inflammation, leading to an increased risk of high blood pressure, 
heart disease, cerebral infarction, and diabetes. In addition, it has been argued that 
disturbance of interoception and dysregulation of bodily states due to allostatic load 
is a major cause of depression (Barrett et al., 2016; Barrett & Simmons, 2015; 
McEwen, 2003; Stephan et al., 2016). Indeed, depression is sometimes accompanied 
by somatic disorders such as cardiac, immunological, and metabolic disturbances 
(Joynt, Whallen, & O'Connor, 2003; Renn, Feiciano, & Segal, 2011). In the 
framework of predictive coding, this can be explained as persistent effects of 
impaired high-level internal models predicting uncontrollability and uncertainty of 
environments with greater precision on functions in allostatic control regions, such 
as the insula and anterior cingulate cortex, or on autonomic effector regions, such as 
the hypothalamus and periaqueductal gray, leading to an allostatic load resulting in 
somatic disturbances. These concepts are consistent with the results of the current 
simulation, suggesting that accumulation of allostatic load in everyday life by biases 
of parameters in reinforcement learning might be a critical factor in depression. 
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A. No reward prediction error B. Healthy individual C. Depressive individual 
   
   
   
Figure 4. Simulation of the responses in blood pressure influenced by decision-making. A: At 
the initiation of decision-making task (①), the set point of blood pressure is shifted upward 
and blood pressure elevates. At the termination of the task (②), the set point is shifted 
downward and blood pressure returns to baseline. B: In a healthy individual, by introducing 
signals of reward prediction error in reinforcement learning (Figure 3) into the higher model, 
rapid elevation of blood pressure and a gradual decline of blood pressure (habituation) are 
shown, accompanying learning progress. C: In a depressive individual, slow and unstable 
decision-making results in the maintenance of greater reward prediction error, resulting in a 
sustained high level of blood pressure, even after the termination of the task. 
 
In addition to the parameters in the reinforcement learning model, the 
parameters in the model of interoception may also be related to impaired emotional 
states (Ohira, 2018b). For example, depression can be caused by a reaction to an 
initial somatic disease. Systemic inflammation mediated by increased 
proinflammatory cytokines, such as IL-6 and TNF-α, can affect brain functions and 
are linked with the onset of depression (Dantzer, O'Connor, Freund, Johnson, & 
Kelley, 2008). This might cause greater prediction errors in the allostatic control 
regions, leading to updating of the internal models in a negative direction, 
accompanied by hedonically negative affective experiences. In addition, it has been 
argued that noisy bodily signals to the brain and unstable fluctuation of interoception 
might cause subjective experiences of anxiety (Farb et al., 2015; Stewart, Buffett-
Jerrott, & Kokaram, 2001). In a previous study, the author attempted to simulate this 
phenomenon by increasing the variance of the noise term 𝑒1(Normal~(0, 𝜋𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦
−1 )) 
shown  in  Figure 2,  specifically,  introducing  a large value of 𝜋𝑏𝑜𝑑𝑦




Prediction error Prediction error 
Blood pressure Blood pressure 
Predicition Predicition 
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manipulation, the predictions generated by the internal model of blood pressure 
became unstable and noisy (Ohira, 2018b). If changes of prediction might be felt as 
subjective and affective experiences, such unstable fluctuation might be essential for 
experiences of anxiety. 
 
Implications for Emotional Intelligence 
 
The computational model proposed in this article describes basic and abstract 
mechanisms of association among interoception, decision-making, and regulation of 
bodily states. This model has implications for various issues related to emotional 
intelligence. One of the important factors of emotional intelligence is the use of 
emotions for guidance of adaptive thoughts and behaviors (Hogeveen et al., 2016; 
Mayer & Salovey, 1997). This factor is closely related to decision-making, as 
evaluation of the values of available behaviors and choosing one specific behavior 
that is appropriate for a specific case is an important function of decision-making in 
everyday life. Emotions have been thought to play critical roles in decision-making. 
Because we occasionally face situations in which the values of available options and 
contingencies between options and outcomes are not clear (uncertainty), we 
sometimes rely not only on deliberate and thoughtful processes, but also on affective 
or intuitive processes in decision-making (Damasio, 1994). The model proposed in 
the current article explicitly explains the mechanisms underlying such processes. 
Changes of bodily states to a predicted set point are evaluated as reward and produce 
hedonically positive affective states. Reward determined in such a way can then 
update the values of options, which can be used in decision-making at the next 
opportunity. When bodily signals can be precisely conveyed to the brain, and 
parameters of reinforcement learning are within an appropriate range, learning 
processes rapidly converge and appropriate decision-making and regulation of bodily 
states are possible. In contrast, disturbances in these mechanisms can be linked with 
impaired mental and physical well-being. In this sense, the well-tuned functions of 
the brain and body described in the model might provide the minimal bases of 
emotional intelligence. 
According to the psychological constructivist theory of emotion (Barrett, 2017; 
Barrett et al., 2016; Barrett & Simmons, 2015), subjective experiences of emotions 
are generated by categorization of interoceptive affective states using concepts based 
in cognitive structure as well as information from the external context. This process 
corresponds to another component of emotional intelligence, recognition of the 
emotional states of the self. Such processes of awareness of one's emotional states 
constitute the basis of recognition of emotional states of others. Furthermore, 
emotion regulation is another important factor of emotional intelligence, and is based 
on appropriate emotional awareness. Theorists have recently begun to discuss how 
such concepts of emotions are generated and shared between people, particularly 
during processes of socializing in the period of infancy (Hoemann & Barrett, 2018; 
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Hoemann et al., 2020). Although the model proposed in the current article does not 
explain the processes of generation of experienced emotions, it has implications for 
the consideration of such processes. Atzil and Gendron (2017) argued that concepts 
of emotions play an important role in maintaining ongoing physiological balance and 
allostasis, and that infants learn emotion concepts for allostasis regulation via bio-
behavioural synchrony with caregivers. If this reasoning is accurate, the mechanisms 
of interoception described in the currently proposed model may develop through 
such a co-action process in infancy, and concepts of emotions should be created to 
efficiently regulate the mechanisms. In this sense, emotional intelligence is a set of 





The current article introduced a basic conceptual framework integrating 
interoception, decision-making, and allostasis based on the perspective of predictive 
coding, and it proposed a computational model to explain the mechanisms of those 
psychological, behavioural, and physiological phenomena. Furthermore, the article 
discussed how the mechanisms of interoception are related to factors of emotional 
intelligence. A tentative conclusion of this article is that the ultimate purpose of 
allostasis regulation is to maintain life, while the mechanisms of interoception have 
been developed to serve this purpose, and emotional intelligence can be considered 
to constitute a set of abilities for efficiently operating these mechanisms. Although 
the model proposed in this article is simply a theoretical model that does not provide 
explanations or predictions for concrete psychological and physiological indices in 
real situations, the model is useful for providing an integrated description of the 
functions of the brain and body to explain accumulated empirical findings regarding 
emotions. Specifically, such a computational perspective will be useful for 
elucidating how basic physiological components are related to facets of emotional 
intelligence, how emotional intelligence is linked with well-being and illness as 
regulation and dysregulation of allostasis, and how emotional intelligence can be 
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